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Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and think tanks in developing countries have been 
supported by international donors since the 1990s often in the name of a democratisation 
process of the governance structures, or/and in order to promote better research that informs 
policy. Given that the growth of civil society is generally associated with the greater 
accountability of policymakers and improved justice in society there has been an increase in 
specialised think tanks in the development sector spanning a range of development related 
issues such as human development, policy analysis, sustainable development, inequalities, 
social justice, agricultural policy, governance, food security, social protection, and human 
rights. The production and dissemination of knowledge within one country is rarely a linear 
process and involves a myriad of public and private stakeholders.  
 
The objective of this paper is to answer two core questions: what are the relationships between 
think tanks and universities in Bangladesh and how do these relationships influence policy? 
To answer these questions requires an understanding of a) what factors encourage or 
discourage different types of relationships between think tanks and universities, and b) the 
complex relationships between knowledge creation and policymaking. Based on an extensive 
literature review and empirical research, a key argument of the paper is that the impartiality, 
independence, and efficiency of think tanks and universities in creating knowledge for 
policymaking is highly dependent on institutional politics and individual and personalized 
relationships. In most cases think tanks and universities have very limited or non-existent 
institutional relationships with each other. Where such relationships do exist, they occur at the 
individual rather than institutional level and focus on quite specific and time bound projects 
with clear outputs. This study also finds that such individual relationships result from key 
characteristics such as institutional politics, academic discouragement, low investment in staff 
and research in public and private universities, commercialization of knowledge production, 
and the weak, temporary and conditional access to funding by think tanks.  
 
The first section of the paper briefly traces the origins of governance issues in the development 
discourse and explores the underlying motivations of development partners to support civil 
society actors and universities in developing countries. It explores the emergence of think tanks 
and their role as civil and policy actors. The second section presents the qualitative 
methodology followed in this research and the main challenges faced during the fieldwork in 
Bangladesh, our case study. The third section analytically contextualizes the relationship 
between think tanks and universities into a broader historical understanding of Bangladeshi 
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society. It explores the origins of the dominant political culture, the role think tanks and 
universities play in the knowledge society, their role and relationship in civil society, and the 
influence these processes have in policymaking. 
 
This paper also explores the process of fragmentation of knowledge creation in Bangladesh 
across multiple stakeholders and draws out its implications on knowledge society, civil society 
and policy. It argues that the reliance of research on external funds affects the capacity of think 
tanks to be autonomous, which can often distort the role of think tanks landscape in 
Bangladesh and makes it highly heterogeneous and in some cases weak. The fragmentation 
of the research process, and its reliance on civil society, in turn, affects the type of research 
outputs being produced whereas in some cases weakens the research capacities of think tanks 
and universities. These two actors generally interact with each other in a collaborative manner 
at an institutional level and the majority of their interactions, individual-based, have strong 
commercial bases.  
 
It is useful to contextualize the theoretical role of think tanks and universities in eastern 
development discourse. Studies centered around universities and think tanks have their roots 
in the west and in many cases institutions conducting these studies receive funding directly 
from international donors and development agencies.  
 
The emergence of governance issues in relation to democratization and development is 
explored in the first part of this section. The second part locates think tanks and universities as 
policy and civil actors in development discourse.  
 
A. Emergence of Governance Issues in Western Development 
Discourse 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, international development agencies and donors developed and 
prioritised the “good governance” agenda. This quickly became an important policy leverage 
tool, and helped re-balance some of the extremes of the previous market-based liberalization 
focus (Doornbos 2001). In the development discourse, a consensus emerged between aid 
agencies, scholars and development partners, which recognised the importance of engaging 
with national governments in order for development practice and policy to be more sustainable 
and effective (Cornwall & Brock 2005).  
 
Donors supported developing countries under specific good governance requirements and 
conditions (Parnini 2009). This concerned issues of transparency of public administration 
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(corruption notably), enforcement of human rights and public sector reform (PSR). The 
adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) reflect the concretization of this mainstreamed development discourse into policy and 
practices which intended to prevent aid within developing countries from fragmenting and 
building inefficiencies through multi-sectoral downstream approaches through interacting 
directly at the macro-policy level and thus harmonize and strengthen developmental targets 
(Parnini 2009, Ellis & Biggs 2001). The rationale for pressing developing countries’ national 
governments to adopt PRSPs and MDGs as poverty reduction tools and targets demonstrated 
development partners’ intention to make governments aware of their responsibilities and 
commitment towards target achievements. Different development stakeholders bought into a 
result-orientated long-term strategy, which provided measurable targets for the governments 
of recipient countries to strive forward.  
 
At the same time, external support for democratization of developing countries was also seen 
through the support given to civil society institutions, which played a substantial role in 
policymaking (Flanagan & Wray-Lake 2011, Kabeer et al. 2010, Lewis 2004). The appearance 
of think tanks in Western countries was, to some extent, considered an opportunity for civil 
society to enter the policymaking process from which they had previously been excluded by 
major political actors. The states’ recognition and acceptance of the potential contribution of 
think tanks to policymaking is a long process. The level and quality of interaction between civil 
society and government actors varies from country to country. Some governments have been 
and are slower in developing structures, which are inclusive of civil society institutions. The 
development of think tanks and large NGOs has, in some developing countries, transformed 
the way governments made evidence-based policy decisions, and helped maintain some 
accountability in the political sphere (Harsh et al. 2010, Kaldor 2003, Uphoff 1996). According 
to some, this interaction and engagement resulted in more democratic forms of governance 
(Kaldor 2003) with think tanks being seen as representing citizens’ interests and promoting 
greater transparency (Abelson 2009, Pautz 2011). 
 
1. Political and Civil Actors and Policymaking 
 
Though NGOs are often perceived as the most prominent civil society actors, this paper is 
concerned with understanding the present functions and place occupied by think tanks and 
universities, and their relationships within the policymaking processes. Publications available 
on this process occurring in developing countries’ context are scarce. Development literature 
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is primarily concerned with NGOs – and to a much lesser extent, think tanks – while universities 
remain largely neglected.   
 
1.1 Think Tanks 
In the North American context, think tanks emerged in the mid-1950s as “non-governmental, 
not-for profit research organisations with substantial organisational autonomy from 
government and from societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties” 
(McGann and Weaver 2011:4). The non-governmental characteristic of think tanks does not 
imply that institutions that receive funding from governmental sources do not qualify as think 
tanks per se, but it highlights the relative level of independence of think tanks from government 
and state structures. The definition of think tank proposed by Abelson (2009:4) insists on the 
objective of these institutions which he describes as non-profit, non-partisan organizations 
engaged in the study of public policy  [my italics]” which “organize and transform issues and 
ideas into policy debates”. The function of think tanks can be perceived as both apolitical (i.e. 
politically neutral) and political (Faro 2012). The process of conducting research and producing 
knowledge in order for example to influence public policy is inherently political. The process of 
decision-making, which results in some themes or issues being prioritised over others, cannot 
be separated out from broader ideological influences and/or political agendas (Majone 1989). 
And yet, research entities and knowledge creators must establish their impartiality in order to 
be taken seriously in the policy debates and dialogues (McGann & Weaver 2011, Pautz 2011). 
Their effectiveness in advocating for and communicating on issues relies heavily on the ability 
to demonstrate the rigour, quality and reliability of their work. If the latter are questioned, the 
ability of think tanks to engage in public debate and policy advocacy is undermined.  
 
1.2 Universities  
The number of knowledge creating organisations has increased in developing countries 
(NGOs research wings, research institutes, think tanks and universities) and the external donor 
support to some of these institutions dates back to the 1980s (Srivastava 2011). This trend is 
partly based on the premise that strengthening the linkages between civil society and national 
governments as well as supporting knowledge creation would develop more rigorous and more 
evidence-based policy decisions. These arrangements, it is argued, have the potential to 
improve governments’ and public administrations’ accountability to citizens in countries where 
interactions are infrequent and sometimes ineffective. International development agencies 
(World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Development Association, the United 
Nations, and a number of industrially and economically developed countries’ governments) 
started supporting the development of think tanks in developing countries in the early 2000s 




In theory, universities are “key drivers” within the knowledge society which sometimes have 
the opportunity and capacity to develop relationship with other players in the knowledge society 
(Peters 2003). In the literature and in society, universities are perceived as “keepers” and 
“creators of knowledge” which seek “to prepare new generations with the skills, cultural and 
scientific literacy, flexibility and capacity for critical inquiry and moral choice necessary to make 
their own contributions to society” (Birgeneau 2005:x). The value and originality of the 
knowledge created by universities often depend on their level of autonomy and their internal 
management staff monitoring and incentive systems.  
 
There are three typologies of relationships between think tanks and universities: collaboration, 
competition or convergence. All three typologies remain largely under-studied. The 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Asian research team working on this 
research project theorized the political economy of knowledge production and policymaking 
focusing on the relationships between think tanks and universities as illustrated in Figure 1. 
This conceptualization is based on the initial observation and assumption that the boundaries 
between university research centres, research institutes, consultancy firms and think tanks 
have become more blurred. Arguably if think tanks used to represent development 
“contractors” and universities represented “architects” of knowledge and policy interaction 
(Wood 2013), the former have evolved so much in the last  few decades that the clear-cut 
dichotomy might not be relevant in some contexts. The analysis presented in section four 
confronts this theoretical framework to our empirical evidence and proposes a new analytical 
model for understanding these relationships. 
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B. Research Methodology and Tools 
 
This study adopted a qualitative approach in order to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
specific challenges and opportunities faced by think tanks and universities as they attempted 
to produce knowledge and/or influence policy. It is important to emphasize that the principal 
investigator was involved at all stages during data collection, data analysis, and the generation 
of this report.  
 
1. Key informant interviews  
 
In Part 1 of the fieldwork, in-depth interviews and personal observations were used besides 
secondary literature reviews (academic articles, reports and websites). With the help of an 
assistant, the researcher identified a set of key informants based within think tanks and 
universities. The criteria used to select participants included: their position in the hierarchy of 
their respective institutions and, when possible, their level of experience working with key 
stakeholders in Bangladesh. As much as possible, the researcher selected senior and high-
level respondents since they tended to be better positioned to provide useful insights on key 
issues regarding knowledge production in Bangladesh and the role of think tanks and 
universities in producing and disseminating knowledge and advocating for policy.2 Twenty one 
audio recorded in-depth interviews were conducted with key stakeholders active at both the 
university and think tank level. These lasted for 30 minutes to three hours. The interviews 
followed the structure of a questionnaire developed before the start of fieldwork. The fieldwork 
was conducted in October and November 2013 in Dhaka.  
 
2. Institutional case studies 
 
As part of Phase 2 of the research project, the team focused on generating the answers to our 
core questions through developing three institutional case studies in each country context, 
which illustrate different typologies of institutions. In the case of Bangladesh, the selection of 
the case studies was made on the basis of the model developed by the regional research team. 
The first case study presented in Annex B is the analysis of the Institute of Governance Studies 




2 The list of respondents included in the study can be found in Annex A 
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(IGS) which is the case of a think tank, which holds a prestigious unconditional grant from 
IDRC and which continues to be progressively incorporated into the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) University (BRACU). The second case study (Annex B) is 
the institutional analysis of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS). The third 
case study, in Annex B is the analysis of the evolution and development of Dhaka University 
(DU) since the 1980s as a hosting institution for think tanks and research centres.  
 
3. Participants and institutions’ selection process  
 
Initially, the intention was to include a number of institutions from different regions of 
Bangladesh. We eventually decided to concentrate our work in Dhaka, the capital city, for three 
reasons. First, during our initial scoping exercise it became clear that most of the key 
stakeholders in both the university and think tank sectors had some professional base in Dhaka 
even if their employing institutions were located outside of Dhaka. This is not an observation 
unique to the university or think tank sectors. Bangladesh is also known as one of the NGO 
capitals of the world, and NGO offices can be found in the most remote parts of the country. 
However, the vast majority of NGOs have offices or headquarters in Dhaka even if they do not 
have field operations in the capital centre. This allows NGOs to be closer to the heart of the 
economic, social and political life of the country, and also importantly to be closer to 
representatives of the international community. The same dynamic arrangement prevails with 
think tank and university stakeholders.  
 
Second, it also became clear during our initial scoping exercise that although there were many 
think tanks in the country, many had either relatively few activities or existed in name only. This 
was more likely the case for think tanks, which were located outside Dhaka. A similar 
observation was made in the university sector – albeit on a small-scale. The government of 
Bangladesh is committed to expanding the number of universities throughout the country3 and 
this has resulted in an increase in the number of private universities in particular, mostly in 
Dhaka city. This expansion, however, has not gone without criticism and suspicion including 
reports of illegal campuses and fake universities being established for political as opposed to 
academic reasons.  
 




3 The government plans to establish a university in each of the country’s districts 
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Finally, our data collection coincided with a particularly volatile period in the electoral cycle of 
Bangladesh. With national parliamentary elections set for January 2014, the latter part of 2013 
was replete with frequent and increasingly violent hartals (strikes). This considerably restricted 
the mobility of the researchers and respondents and heightened concerns around safety. Also, 
during this time, the respondents (of think tanks) were busy responding and engaging with the 
political processes in place while university teachers and directors were concerned about the 
impact of hartals on the completion of final exams. Although this context considerably affected 
the fieldwork (respondents sample size and geographic coverage), it did not negatively impact 
on the quality of the information gathered.  
 
4. Data analysis  
 
The principal investigator collected and analysed the different type of data collected. This 
enabled the researcher to ensure high levels of coherence and reliability of the findings 
exposed in this report. This entailed undertaking an intensive review of literature on 
governance themes in Bangladesh, an analysis and the transcription of twenty one audio 
recordings, a website search on institutions and a study of secondary data collected at the 
institutional level. The analysis and main findings are presented in the following section and 
the detailed institutional case studies are in Annex B. 
 
C. Major Findings of Research  
 
1. The Bangladesh Case Study 
  
This section explores the major findings from this research. Understanding how knowledge is 
created and the role different types of institutions play in it requires a deep understanding of 
the political culture of the country. In Bangladesh, this helps to analyse the way in which 
stakeholders respond and adjust to the complex set of challenges and opportunities they face 
(Faro 2012:10). Research findings show that political culture in Bangladesh dominates 
institutional and personal relationships within three major domains (knowledge society, civil 
society and the policy sphere) and affects the research culture, processes and quality of 
outputs.  
 
Considering the political economy of knowledge creation and the pressures this puts on both 
demand and supply for knowledge (for policy especially) we contextualize the study of the 
relationships between think tanks and universities within three domains: the knowledge 
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society, civil society and the policy sphere. The data presented in the next sections shows how 
the knowledge society in Bangladesh is composed of a few institutions, within which individuals 
often struggle to maintain “academic freedom” (or autonomy). Institutions in that category (by 
mandate) face significant constraints, notably financial ones that limits the possibilities of direct 
overlap or contribution of knowledge society to policymaking within the policy sphere – which 
is why a, in figure 2, is smaller than b and c. As a result, there is some overlap with individual 
civil society members (such as NGO-based researchers) or “consultancy” type think tanks 
which prefer to accumulate a double identity (b, on figure 2). The most typical example of this 
is the participation of university teachers in think tanks consultancies (or short-term research 
project) sponsored or commissioned by external stakeholders. Civil society institutions, often 
sponsored by external actors (with a political agenda and set expectations) mainly conduct 
short-term research projects, which can affect their internal research capacity, their level of 
autonomy and the quality of knowledge and critical thinking. Civil society actors have, however, 
relatively good access to resources and policy-makers which is why c, in figure 2, is larger than 
a and b. The space for relationships between civil society actors and policy makers, in the 
current political context is greater than the space for knowledge society to interaction with the 
policy sphere and greater than the space available to civil society to engage with the 
knowledge society, institutionally. The overlap between civil society and policymaking (c, in 
Figure 2), is however, to be considered carefully as civil society actors’ capacity to drive and 














Figure 2: The knowledge and policymaking economy in Bangladesh: a model4 
 
Source: the author 
 
This analytical section is organized as follows. The first section traces the dominant political 
culture in Bangladesh and explains how it can represent an important challenge to the 
governance of some public, private and often “third sector” institutions. The last two sections 
provide an analysis of the interactions between think tanks and universities within the 
knowledge society, civil society, and the policy sphere. It explores the main challenges to 
producing knowledge and conducting research in an environment where institutional autonomy 
is rare. Along those three interrelated sections, the discussion is framed around the theoretical 
evidence-based model, illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
1.1 Bangladesh’s Political Culture  
Given that the role of think tanks and universities in a society varies according to context, this 
section presents a brief historical overview of the political culture in Bangladesh. It is argued 
that governance structures and systems in place generally lack accountability to citizens 
presenting significant symptoms of mal-governance (clientelism, elitism, partisanship and 
corruption). This can be found in public and private institutions and, third sector organisations.  
 
Since achieving independence in 1971, Bangladesh’s public administration and political 
institutions have undergone significant and continuous transformation. Public  administration 
and bureaucracy, which before 1971 used to attract knowledgeable and talented people, has 
since suffered from politicization (Jahan and Shahan, 2008). As a result the quality of the 




4 This model was developed by the author based on the data collected during fieldwork, and secondary 










accountability with the public administration systems after the British and Pakistani periods 
eroded (Huque 2011, Huque and Rahman 2003).  
 
Political instability has characterised the last four decades resulting in successive coups d’état, 
violent political changes and confrontations combined with military interventions. This has 
profoundly affected the way in which power is exercised by the government (Huque &  Rahman 
2003) and the legitimacy of the government (Huque 2011:63). A number of factors contributed 
to nurturing problems of governance (Huque 2011) including corruption, inefficiency, lack of 
accountability, ineffective bureaucracy, elitism, political cronyism, factionalism, patronage and 
clientelism (Jahan & Shahan 2008, Zafarullah 1987). In addition natural disasters, famines and 
economic stagnation, have led to the emergence of an organized civil society that has 
incentivized the state to use forms of despotic power (Srivastava 2011). This new political and 
bureaucratic culture has proliferated especially in weak and nascent public institutions (Huque, 
2011). In relation to this, Kochanek writes: ….a combination of weak institutions, patrimonial 
politics, personalized political parties, patron-client relationships, and the absence of political 
consensus have resulted in a partial democracy dominated by perverse corruption, a lack of 
transparency, normless behaviour, an absence of public accountability, and political instability 
(2000:531).  
 
For many years, allegiance to the ruling party (Rahman 2002:51) has been an important 
criterion which political institutions have used to recruit and appoint civil servants to positions 
of power, obtain rapid promotions and favours from other bureaucrats. More than their 
performance, experience or merit, bureaucrats could become influential senior members of 
civil administration if they directly served the interest of the party (Zafarullah & Rahman 2008, 
Ahmed 1980). This partisanship contributed to establishing a culture of patronage within major 
public administrations and the cabinet which transformed the “state machinery including law 
enforcement and the judiciary […] into politicized instruments of the ruling party” (Sarker 
2008:1423). Self-serving civil servants pursuing personal interests (Zafarullah 2013, Zafarullah 
1987) still largely dominate these opaque micro-bureaucratic within public administrations 
which affect their performance and accountability to citizens (Huque & Rahman 2003, Rahman 
2002).  
 
1.2 Elitism and Clientelism 
Such governance systems have contributed to establishing a culture of elitism within the public 
institutions. (The term ‘élite’ here refers to a small and exclusive group of persons who have a 
political function, enjoy higher status and power within the political system and exploit the 
advantages power can provide them). In politics, élites generally emerge from contexts where 
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the distribution of power in society is unequal and hierarchical (relying on patrons). This group 
is often, according to Meisel (1962:4) and Putnam (1976:4), highly conscious of the benefits 
of belonging to this particular group and sharing its values and norms. The members pursue 
the common interest of preserving the group’s power and the members’ status, which in our 
country case, according to Zafarullah, can lead to power “abuses”, “malevolence”, “venality” 
and “malfeasance” (2007:169). In Bangladesh, these are engrained in the core of the political 
culture and adversely impact on the efficiency of public institutions, rational decision-making, 
performance and accountability (Sarker 2009). 
 
In Bangladesh, this type of élitism established significant patron client politics which affected 
the way in which the country was governed both formally and informally (Sarker 2008:1417). 
(Clientelism is the result of a calculation of certain groups in the society, which make the 
rational decision to engage with state actors in a way that allows them to obtain favours. Clients 
of élite groups are not necessarily loyal to a political party but use them to pursue their personal 
interests through preserving good relationships with patrons). Alam and Teicher (2012) find 
that besides partisanship, recruitment decisions in the civil service, police administration, 
regulatory and judiciary bodies are based on clientelist relationships. According to a few 
authors, favouring certain political leanings constitutes the violation of principles of impartiality, 
equality and fairness, which destroy “the moral standing of fundamental institutions, turning 
them into profiteering tools for the distribution of patronage and its benefits” (Alam and Teicher, 
2012:881).  
 
All of these factors affect Bangladesh’s political economy at different levels. In rural areas, 
social relations are often dependent on the domination of the élite based on landholding, and 
resources allocation. This system of patron-clientelism based on wider friendship and kinship 
relationships or political allegiance create extra-bureaucratic networks where transactions and 
decisions are arbitrary driven by personal ambition (which often lies in preserving the élite’s 
power) (Wood 2000) . Pervasive patronage processes and relationships between state actors 
and civil society actors underpin policymaking processes in Bangladesh (Huque 2011, Parnini 
2006:190, Sarker 2008, Kochanek 2000).  
 
One of the most documented symptoms of such informal processes is corruption within political 
and bureaucratic power structures. “The abuse of public office for private gain”, hinders the 
quality of administrative performance and the fairness of its decisions (Huque, 2011:51) which 
has many consequences on the way citizens are governed (Khan 2003). First, because 
corruption often excludes poorer segments of the society that often lack  bargaining power 
within these entities; the poor suffer more from lower quality public services compared to the 
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rest of society (Kamal 2000). Second, the corrupt behaviour of public officials and the allocation 
of resources based on kinship and friendship networks rather than performance and efficiency 
can result in inefficient project planning and execution (Zafarullah 2013, Zafarullah & Rahman 
2008, Khan 2003). Third, corruption can dis-incentivise underpaid civil servants because 
performance is not rewarded and in some cases can be penalized (Sarker 2009, Sarker & 
Rahman 2007). 
 
1.3 Civil Society 
Bangladesh has a vibrant civil society which includes NGOs, indigenous community groups, 
cooperatives, professional bodies, trade unions, think tanks and the media (Huque 2011). The 
growth of NGOs in particular has come to mark the development of civil society in Bangladesh.  
Following Independence in 1971, NGOs were heavily involved in rehabilitation and 
reconstruction efforts in the country. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the NGO sector grew 
steadily. However, from the 1990s, growth accelerated significantly and NGOs were soon at 
the centre of poverty reduction and democracy building initiatives (Alam & Teicher 2012, Khan 
2003, Kamal 2000, White 1999). International donor agencies tended to encourage successive 
governments of Bangladesh to engage with NGOs on development activities and were 
instrumental in the rise of the sector (Sarker 2009).  
 
During the 1990s, international donors promoted good governance programmes in 
Bangladesh implemented by civil society actors prominently NGOs. For some, civil society 
actors like NGOs helped support governance and democracy by increasing accountability and 
participation (2001:185). Others, however, argued that NGOs were not able to free themselves 
from the country’s culture of political clientelism and patronage (Devine 2003, Devine 2006) 
and as a result, were not able to act as autonomous organisations representing the interest of 
the poor (Parnini 2009:562, Sarker 2008:1427, Parnini 2006) or tackling the deeper causes of 
poor governance (Banks & Hulme 2012). 
 
In view of the political culture and structures described above, the scope for non-state actors 
to contribute to or influence policymaking processes is limited. Zafarullah (2007: 169) argues 
that if some non-state actors interact with policy makers, the interaction is “rarely” effective in 
terms of influencing policy formulation. Many authors report that the public bureaucracy’s 
inertia, alienation and politicization are the main obstacles to better interaction between state 
and non-state actors and reforms (Zafarullah & Rahman 2008, Khan & Zafarullah 1982). The 
failure of important national reforms can be attributed to ”bureaucratic intransigence and 
inertia, political insensitivity and inaction, anti-reform sentiment in public sector organisations 
and alienation of the civil society from the reform process” (Zafarullah 2002:66). In short, in 
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Bangladesh the state’s structures are based on long-established patrimonial dynamics and a 
complex web of patron/client relationships, which, according to some authors, has a limited 
capacity to refuse major donors’ pressures (Kochanek 2000:549). In this context, civil society 
organisations have had to find strategies to sustain their activities within the civil society arena 
and within the policy sphere. These are explored in the following sections. 
 
2. The Knowledge Society in Bangladesh  
 
This section explores the “knowledge society” in Bangladesh. The concept of knowledge 
society is referred to frequently in the literature and by research participants to explain their 
observation of problems with knowledge production in Bangladesh. They analyse existing gaps 
in the current state of research and knowledge creation in Bangladesh. Participants insisted 
on how producing knowledge (as opposed to information) has the potential to empower its 
possessors (intellectually and practically). For the purpose of being analytically clear, 
knowledge society, in this paper, is defined as a space within which self-determining 
institutions set their research agendas based on indigenous needs and interests and conduct 
the research to create original knowledge independently. In this section, it is argued that in 
Bangladesh the knowledge society is weak. Only a few institutions are active in producing 
knowledge (including a few universities, a few large NGOs with strong research wings and a 
few think tanks). The data collected shows that such institutions face significant challenges 
and limitations, which prevent them from pursuing their core research and capacity building 
mission and from being more pro-active within the knowledge society. This section explores 
the opportunities and challenges faced by major institutions within the knowledge society and 
analyses some of the implications for civil society and for policymaking. 
 
Frustrated actors (individual and institutions) face significant challenges, which are explored 
below. Based on respondents’ opinions and experiences, this section shows how, within the 
knowledge society, universities, as institutions, make little contribution to knowledge for 
policymaking and remain confined to their disciplinary roles (teaching) generally dis-engaged 
from policy debates. As a result, teachers based at few “teaching organisations” such as 
universities (some private some public), engage themselves with think tanks within the civil 
society sphere (more supported by donors’ projects and development partners’ support) to 
escape the structural and financial challenges they face in their institutions. The extent to which 
these forms of engagement lead to policy changes (within political society) is discussed in 





2.1 Universities’ Challenges and Limitations to Knowledge Production  
The first finding emerging from this study was that when public and private universities engage 
in research, this affects the academic work undertaken within those structures and pushes 
teachers towards individual personalized career paths outside the knowledge society through 
regular interaction with civil society actors. Some authors such as Altbach argue that 
“academic freedom”, the capacity given to higher education teachers to research and publish 
freely, should be at the “very core” of universities’ mission (2001:205). The data presented in 
this section shows that in Bangladesh academic freedom of teachers from public or private 
universities is generally low given the lack of financial resources and institutional support 
granted to research the production of knowledge is either under-valued or instrumentalised.  
 
Here, it is worth briefly outlining the higher education landscape in Bangladesh. The country’s 
first university, Dhaka University, was founded in 1921; and its second, Rajshahi University, in 
1953. Both were founded as part of a process of colonial power enforcement (first the British 
and then the Pakistani colonial rule) through education and publication. After independence 
and until 1985, there were six public universities in Bangladesh5 (Rahman 2003). More than 
twenty years after the Private University Act (1992), the country has 34 public and 76 private 
universities (UCG 2013). The implementation of social sciences courses such as sociology, 
anthropology and development studies was first introduced in major public universities like 
Dhaka University and Jahangir Nagar University thanks to the support of external donors6. The 
pressures and challenges to producing knowledge differ significantly between public and 




Despite the significant rise in the number of private actors in higher education, the reputation 
of public universities is one of the guarantors of quality knowledge production in the county. 
Private universities on the whole do not enjoy such a reputation – although this may be 
changing. A few public universities benefit from international recognition, including The 
Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and Dhaka University which, 




5 Four general universities (Dhaka University Rajshahi University, Chittagong and Jahangir Nagar 
Universities which were established in the second half of 1960s), and two technical universities 
(University of Engineering and Technology BUET and Bangladesh Agricultural University, BAU) 
6 Mr. Khondaker Sakhawat Ali  
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as one respondent highlighted, was once called “the Oxford of the East”.7 Similarly to what 
Kors and Silverglate (1998) observed in the USA, this study finds that public university teachers 
and their student bodies tend to be publically affiliated with political parties and are important 
public political activists (pundits) in the country. The power of political parties within universities 
reflects how political parties see universities as key developers of the nascent futures elites’ 
civic engagement. The political attachment of teachers is significant and, according to the 
majority of respondents, affects the internal functioning of universities. One example of this is 
the significance of political affiliations during teachers’ association elections8. This 
phenomenon, according to some respondents, leads to universities dis-engaging with 
knowledge creation and in turn affects universities’ effectiveness in developing and serving as 
valuable actors in the knowledge society9.  Sakhawat Ali, a research fellow at PPRC said: 
 
Political loyalism is a key element within our public universities. Recruitment, promotion 
and posting, everything is happening based on loyalism. So the quality of the 
knowledge suffers and we are not investing in research. […] People who have the 
quality and the intention of creating knowledge go outside, for their livelihood and for 
their knowledge ‘hunch’10 also. So the private sector and development sector give them 
opportunities. As a result knowledge production is not institutionalized.  
 
This encroachment of politics within academia goes against the principles of “academic 
freedom” and, according to many respondents, affects the independence, impartiality, and 
autonomy of knowledge production within public universities. Such internal politics contributes 
to dis-incentivising donors from supporting public universities. Furthermore, “unconditional 
promotion” of teachers based on their political loyalism more than merit discourages teachers 
from conducting research within their universities and publish original work for which they are 
not rewarded. This therefore, pushes lecturers and academics to publish their work in their 
university’s internal journal, as they have lower standards and faster review systems compared 
to international journals.11 The quote above illustrates how mal-governance and non-
meritocratic systems in public universities prompt some teachers to be more active outside 




7 Dr. Zulfikar Ali  
8 Blue, white or pink panel, AL, BNP or left-leaning party respectively, in Dhaka University 
9 Dr. Zulfikar Ali  
10 the term ‘hunch’ here is used to imply the curiosity and hunger for knowledge  
11 Dr. Zulfikar Ali  
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their own universities or to remain fully within knowledge society as political figures or public 
intellectual.  
 
University staff members’ salaries are relatively low (although they vary significantly according 
to experience and status) and allow little engagement of teachers with any other academic 
pursuits besides teaching activities (or political activities in public universities). Respondents 
generally observed that within public universities, the financial resources available for 
conducting research were low and that this affected the quantity and the quality of the research 
outputs generated from these institutions.12 One respondent, Manzoor Hasan (from IGS), 
described it as a “chicken and egg situation” in that the universities do not have sufficient funds 
to finance research, while at the same time their staff members do not get funding because 
their capacities to produce good quality research proposals and obtain research grants is low. 
The paradox emerging here is that although most public universities have sufficiently strong 
faculty capacities to conduct good quality research and publish, the structural limitations posed 
by their universities regarding research platforms and the political recompenses involved in 
stepping out of their institution or remaining within it, are two important factors which constrain 
public university teachers’ involvement within the knowledge society.   
 
Private Universities  
In private universities, according to many respondents, the observations highlighted above are 
fewer because teachers are better paid (higher tuition fees) and the “accountability systems” 
are stronger than in public universities13 where the commercial bottom-line is more crucial.14 
In general, the perception of respondents is that compared to public universities, private 
universities remain relatively independent from party politics.15 Private universities are 
principally preoccupied with recovering their costs and are orientated towards a market-based 
expansion strategy in a way akin to private sector firms. The quality of the knowledge produced 
and the instruments in place to maintain the quality of the research outputs are however non-
existent or inadequate. In fact many respondents said, based on their experiences and 
observations that “very little research is done in the private universities, apart from one or two 




12 Dr. Bazlul Khondoker  
13 Dr. Emdadul Haq  
14 Dr. Sultan Hafeez 
15 Some respondents reported that some private universities had formal rules which forbid political 
activities on their campuses (from both students and teachers) 
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exceptions […] they remain generally uninterested in it.”16 Respondents identified a few private 
universities, which are successful in producing good quality and original research outputs. 
These included BDI, BRACU and North South University, which enjoy strong reputations for 
teaching and place value on research and multiply consultancy activities.17  
 
Similar to think tanks, it appears that to remain relatively independent from the political sphere, 
universities tend to get increasingly closer to private sector actors to whom they provide 
knowledge according to demand. This explains why private and public universities, as 
institutions, have few visible research outputs which contribute to policymaking. This finding 
partly confirms the observation made by Gibbons et al. that universities make limited 
contributions to knowledge production because ‘‘the universities, in particular, will comprise 
only a part, perhaps only a small part, of the knowledge producing sector’’ (1994:85). A number 
of respondents from universities and think tanks warned that through having regular 
consultancy contracts sponsored by private actors, knowledge institutions might be tempted 
to transform into consultancy firms (private actors). The data collected from respondents18 
shows that universities offer their services to private actors, such as banks for example, for 
recruitment purposes by organizing exams and training courses. After 38 years of experience 
at BUET, Dr. Jamilur Reza Chowdhury said, “now BUET has become the number one 
consultancy institution when it comes to engineering. Referring to both the private and public 
sector Dr. Reza added, “….. the first agency they will think of is BUET”19 
 
Although informants recognized the importance of being in touch with the world of practice, 
they also warned of the dangers of consultancies as it reflects a trend of universities to shift 
their priorities towards mobilizing more financial resources. If left unsupervised, the ruthless 
pursuit of more income can jeopardize the faculty of universities and some recommended that 
undertaking consultancy work should be both encouraged and “regulated”.20 The impact 
consultancies have on the quality of the research outputs is, however, difficult to estimate 
through this research. 
 




16 Mr. Manzoor Hasan  
17 Dr. Zulfikar Ali 
18 Dr. Hossain Zillur, Dr. Debapriya Bhattacharya and Mr. Manzoor Hasan  




The political economy of the knowledge society in Bangladesh is characterized by a lack of 
financial resources and structural limitation at the university level to conduct research and 
generate good quality research outputs. Universities’ financial focus on teaching and the lack 
of transparency regarding promotion procedures (in public universities), often dis-incentivizes 
researchers to publish in international peer-reviewed journals. Globally, this type of publication 
generally reflects the quality of the research output generated by universities and the 
international standard particularly valued within the knowledge society. Few university 
teachers in Bangladesh (often in public universities) publish outside national Bangladeshi 
academics journals or publication houses. Unlike peer reviewed journals, the latter have 
significantly weaker review systems. The common perception of respondents is that generally 
universities’ research outputs quality is weak compared to international standards.  
 
2.2 Privatisation of the Knowledge Society   
Public intellectuals and think tank founders explained that one reason for establishing their 
own research institute was to escape the research “inertia” and disinterest of universities 
(described in the previous section) and create their own knowledge creating platform.21 These 
phenomena affect the role played by both private and public universities in the knowledge 
society, and consequently the role think tanks play in producing knowledge and the relationship 
they have with universities. This section explores this argument in more detail. 
 
In the context of Bangladesh the actual role and functions of think tanks is divorced from the 
theory presented in the first two sections of the paper.  The data collected suggests that “think 
tanks” are so diverse that it is hard to categorize them under the same label. A differentiation 
between think tanks is therefore made based on their role within three major arenas: 
knowledge, civil and political societies. While the efficiency of a think tank can be assessed in 
different ways according to its vision and mission, in theory civil society actors focus on a few 
core activities which include setting a political research agenda, researching on particular 
topics to inform policy, framing the debates and making the issues accessible to different types 
of audiences (in compelling ways) and facilitating public dialogue with stakeholders around key 
ideas, topics, or policies (Faro 2012).  
 




21 Mr. Rashed Titumir  
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Within the knowledge society, the data collected strongly indicates that in Bangladesh the 
function and capacity of think tanks to contribute to the production of independent knowledge 
vary considerably according to their internal capacity and financial independence – both of 
which directly conditions their level of autonomy.22 Significant trade-offs and compromises are 
made between financial capacity and autonomy which affect think tanks’ function within the 
knowledge society and can push them to narrow their role as civil society actors engaging with 
shorter-term research projects dependent on donors’ funding. As a result, the quality of the 
research produced by think tanks in Bangladesh is often qualified as “uneven” mainly 
depending on the stability and the nature of the term of funding they are under.23 Think tanks 
struggle to access sustained and untied type of funding which would allow them to keep a clear 
policy focus.24  
 
Think tanks in Bangladesh, unlike other research institutes from outside Bangladesh 
cannot follow a clear research plan because they have insecure funding. They bid for 
research projects funding and then decide to conduct the project for the funder.25 
 
In the knowledge society, there are very few think tanks which are active in critically engaging 
with an issue in an independent manner with the intention to guide policy makers. Centre for 
Policy Dialogue, Institute of Governance Studies, and the Power and Participation Research 
Centre (CPD, IGS and PPRC, respectively) and to some extent BIDS26 are part of this small 
group of institutions, which remain coherent and rigorous in their approach to knowledge 
creation and try to protect their research agenda from external influences as much as possible 
(see Annex B). BIDS has very strict promotion rules based on staff members’ academic 
publications quality and number27 as well as its own internationally recognized peer-reviewed 
journal. This stands as a rare exception and in general think tanks have low or poor 
publications quality standards and monitoring. Such systems certainly incentivize staff 
members to focus on conducting original research work or at least produce good quality 
research outputs. 




22Dr. Sultan Hafeez, Dr. Bazlul Khondaker, and Dr. Shaheen Afroze  
23Dr. Hossain Zillur Rahman, Dr. Bazlul Khondokar, Dr. Manosh Chowdhury, Dr. Debapriya 
Bhattacharya  
24Dr. Hossain Zillur Rahman and Dr. Bazlul Khondokar 
25Dr. Bazlul Khondokar 
26Often seen as a collecting bio-data and ex-post studies for programmes and policies (for the 
government and for development partner agencies)- See annex B. 




On the other hand, one way think tanks reserve their research autonomy and build their 
capacities is establishing linkages with international universities. Collaborative research 
projects with international universities based in South Korea, Japan, the United Kingdom or 
the USA, according to some respondents, enables think tanks to benefit from significant 
financial benefit and more importantly technical support, whilst compromising their autonomy 
to a much lesser extent.   
 
2.3 Think Tank/University Relationships within the Knowledge Society 
Compared to Gibbons et al.’s findings (1994), this study finds that although universities, as 
institutions, have a limited presence in the knowledge society, university staff members, as 
individuals, are often actively engaged in these activities. This is, according to a few 
respondents, “due to both incentive structures and institutional weakness within universities”.28 
University teachers struggling to get sufficient and appropriate funding to pursue individual 
research projects turn towards the private sector. Similarly to what Arocena and Sutz found in 
Latin American universities, in Bangladesh the situation described above results in teachers 
‘migrating’ (establishing an independent think tank or a university research wing) or adopting 
other strategies consisting usually of multiple jobs (2001:1230). The data collected from 
respondents indicates that as a result of this, it is common for public university teachers and 
for private university teachers to “migrate” away from universities to lecture or participate in 
conferences in other universities. For most researchers, combining a post at a university and 
doing regular consultancies for development agencies and think tanks is a common strategy, 
which enables them to supplement their income and publication records as well as survive in 
an underfinanced and politicized knowledge society. Dr. Debapriya (from CPD) said: 
 
Teachers from public universities, of course do not receive enough funding from their 
universities to conduct research so they engage in teaching but not in public 
universities, they take some jobs in the private universities to supplement their income. 
It is not one, not two but three sometimes. And you will find that universities advertise 
that they have public university teachers. 
 




28 Prof. Mustafizur Rahman; Dr. Debapriya Bhattacharya; Dr Jamilur Reza 
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In the knowledge society, some university teachers (mostly from public universities like Dhaka 
University) are heavily involved in conducting long-term research projects through the few think 
tanks that are active within knowledge society. By taking leave from their universities some 
university teachers can pursue their research interests and keep building their research skills. 
The relationship between think tanks and universities within the knowledge society is not 
unilateral and think tanks’ staff members are sometimes active within universities (both public 
and private) to deliver or design teaching module. These types of tasks would correspond to 
“architects” roles described in the conceptual framework but the relationship between 
universities and think tanks on these remain mainly informal and heavily rely on one’s personal 
networks. In the knowledge society, such relationships are limited as the number of institutions 
within it is small and the number of individual actors who can transcend these sectorial 
boundaries is even smaller.  
 
2.4 Civil Society 
Civil society in Bangladesh is dominated by the media, a large number of international and 
national NGOs and think tanks with universities, in theory, excluded from it. Within the “civil 
society” arena the relationships between some types of think tanks and universities are more 
frequent and short-term than within the knowledge society. The think tanks and NGOs active 
within civil society are usually reliant on external funds and tied to “value for money”29 
obligations.30 Although the emergence of think tanks is a relatively recent phenomenon in Asia, 
only five countries have more think tanks31 than Bangladesh (Rashid, 2013, 2012). Most 
private independent think tanks fund themselves through commissioned research work (for the 
GoB, external donors, bi-lateral agencies or large NGOs). Although think tanks cover a large 
number of topics, the level of autonomy of think tanks in selecting those is significantly affected. 
 
2.5 Research: A New Economy? 
A strand of literature has studied the paradox emerging from the need of NGOs to be financially 
sustainable whilst being politically relevant and engaged (Devine and Wood, 2009, Devine, 
2003). Some authors identified a trend in the NGO and microfinance sector to move away from 
public mobilization to focus more on the financial return and value of their operations and 




29 Maximizing outputs from support acquired from external sources 
30 Mr. Rashed Titumir  
31 behind China, India, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea 
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service provision (Lewis, 2011, Kabeer et al., 2010, Kabeer et al., 2012). External funds 
account for the majority of NGOs income source, therefore, have an influence on the way 
NGOs define and prioritize their activities (only few donors and external funding bodies offer 
non-conditional grants). For think tanks too, the reliance on external funding often contributes 
to creating a lack of coherence in their research agenda, which, according to some 
respondents, does not align with the needs of the knowledge society to remain impartial and 
apolitical. In a country where knowledge creation largely relies on external funders it is difficult 
for think tanks to preserve their independence and originality. Dr. Binayak Sen, director of 
research at BIDS, said:  
 
Theoretical critical thinking occurred mainly in the 1960s. Since then the production of 
knowledge has been diverted.[…] I think that knowledge is lagging behind significantly 
and one reason for it is that most of the research in Bangladesh is sponsored research. 
Sponsors may have a different objective function than the national objective function. 
Sponsors may have the objective to study the impact of climate change and poverty 
but this might not be the most important research need.32 
 
Donors and development partners’ intervention, through supporting civil society actors, 
contributes to transforming the type of knowledge created and the research capacity of 
individuals. The knowledge society is a supply-driven sector where research priorities are set 
by external actors and whereby civil society actors are consultancy firms. Arocena and Sutz 
(2001) described the rise of the “call for projects” phenomenon and explored the effects that 
the demand-driven research funding apparatus has on universities in Latin America. In the 
Bangladesh context, this study found that think tanks experience a similar trend of shortening 
research projects against rigid time frames set by external funders. Commissioned knowledge 
outputs produced by think tanks require relatively minor data analysis work. As explained 
earlier, Manzoor Hasan explained that apart from a few exceptions, think tanks “are not 
involved in knowledge production” and that they mostly publish research outputs based on 
“knowledge products together and secondary data” that they put together with a limited 
analytical and critical analysis.33 This is in line with funders’ interest to obtain rapid research 
outputs (mainly reports or books) for which they contract private institutions such as think 
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tanks. Such research outputs are sometimes not made publically available. These types of 
think tanks have often been referred to by respondents as “consultancy firms” as most of their 
time is allocated to findings call for proposals, research grants applications and bidding.34 
These think tanks generally have no scope to develop in-house research capacities and often 
sub-contract data collection or analysis to individuals or other institutions to deliver research 
output. 
 
Across the diverse typology of think tanks in the country, think tanks generally experience 
similar financial limitations which affect their capacity to produce independent knowledge. As 
Dr. Sultan Hafeez describes it: although the purpose of think tanks is to “produce ‘think’ pieces 
that will influence public policy and action” the way in which external funders condition and 
influence their research according to their own interests often interferes with the knowledge 
contribution of think tanks and constrains them from producing apolitical and non-theoretical 
types of information which require little analytical thinking. Overall, within civil society the lack 
of autonomy of think tanks fails to build more democratic structures and according to 
respondents working inside think tanks this affects “the creativity of the research process” and 
the “ability of researchers to create new narratives and challenge mainstream narratives”.35 
Generally, think tanks are increasingly commissioned to conduct programme impact 
assessments, policy effectiveness evaluations and programme related research for 
international donors and development agencies or government ministries. Though valuable for 
programme implementation, this type of work is mainly instrumental.36  
 
Donor organisations and international development agencies contract think tanks to conduct 
this type of work for two major reasons. The first one is that think tanks have developed the 
capacity to bid for grants and contracts and they have the research experience and expertise 
their work requires. The second one is that like with universities, the relationships between 
think tanks and donor agencies have “deformalized” and donors often established 
personalized relationships with individuals within think tanks. As a result, individuals working 
within think tank institutions are regularly approached by external agencies to conduct the 
commissioned research, and in this way donors develop their own networks of experts. 
 




34 Mr. Manzoor Hasan and Dr. Debapriya Bhattacharya 
35 Mr. Rashed Titumir  
36 The value of this type of work depends on the demand from policy-makers  
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University/ Think Tanks Relationships within Civil Society 
In the context described above, university individual staff members, mostly teachers from 
public universities and a few from private universities, often have diverse types of affiliations 
with think tanks within civil society. Given the difficulties university staff members face in their 
own institutions to conduct research, they are often involved in short-term, output-driven or 
periodic types of jobs outside universities. They deliver courses, trainings, seminars and 
research projects undertaken by think tanks. Individual academics and private sector 
institutions like think tanks, within civil society have frequent relations, which make the barriers 
between the two increasingly porous.37 For teachers, non-governmental, non-academic 
institutions such as think tanks, NGOs and donors’ research through short-term consultancies, 
provide access to substantial extra income (related to their salary scale) access to research 
projects in their domain of expertise, access to social networks and exposure to the 
international donors and key national stakeholders38 (and potentially identify future 
researchers). Civil society actors represent an attractive vehicle for teachers to satisfy their 
personal financial needs and pursue their interests. 
 
For think tanks, university teachers represent valuable resources within the civil society arena, 
because they embody a certain status. Their specific level of expertise and research skills is 
valued by think tanks. This situation serves the interest of the “consultancy type think tanks” 
which use the services of university professors and lecturers for report and other paper 
reviews, trainings, seminars and conference purposes, which give them more credibility 
(towards donors, policy-makers and students) and flexibility.39 This indicates how the 
relationships between universities and think tanks, in civil society, are more frequent and 
heavily reliant upon individuals’ connections in terms of conducting research or short-term 
consultancy projects.  
 
This form of collaboration between think tanks and universities is also found at the 
dissemination stage. A number of respondents explained the difficulties think tanks in 
Bangladesh were facing between making a research topic an accessible issue to the citizens 
and a policy issue to policy-makers. These groups use different languages and require a broad 
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set of communication skills.40 In civil society, many think tanks’ efficiency depends on the 
popularity, connectedness and media exposure of a few key staff members. As a result of the 
competition for short-term funding, few think tanks in Bangladesh are established around a 
clear policy agenda on which they have clear ownership. Often the creation of these entities 
and the development of their advocacy and research activities revolve around one strongly 
opinionated, vision-driven person exposed to the media more than in research activities. These 
key civil society representatives have developed wide political networks within the formal 
political and state apparatus and expanded their aura of influence over the years. Sakhawat 
Ali, for example, said: 
 
In most of the cases the think tanks are trying to draw media attention because we think 
that policy advocacy is very useful, I think sometimes this is misguided. Think tanks try 
hard to hit the headlines of the newspapers rather than the content of the research.41 
 
This phenomenon in the long run can weaken the autonomy of think tanks as institutions as 
they can become impotent and struggle to carry the research and advocacy work without them. 
These different factors explored in this section (reliance on short-term, project-based 
conditional funding, on individual personal networks) have an impact on the structures, which 
develop with the knowledge and civil society and the way in which they interact. Dr Debapriya 
Bhattacharya explained:  
 
These mechanisms do not create institutions, do not create sustained capacity, so in 
order to have institutions with sustained capacity, you need to have built that institution 
with a proper portfolio with appropriate predictable funding.42  
 
In line with Sarker’s argument that patron-client politics’ entrenchment in governance 
processes prevents and constraints the institutionalization of good governance structures 
(2008), this paper argues that the way in which think tanks respond to the political context they 
operate in, leads to the promotion of key experts to the detriment of the institutional force of 
civil society actors to be “tanks” within formal policymaking processes. As a result the lines 
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between civil society and political society in Bangladesh are “blurred”.43 Although most 
university teachers and think tanks staff members generally recognize potential benefits to 
establishing more formal forms of institutional collaboration between think tanks and 
universities they also expressed significant reserve and caution. Respondents emphasized 
that for universities and think tanks to collaborate, one needs more leadership and vision44 in 
order to overcome the challenges highlighted in previous sections and establish more 
collaborative and long-term institutional relationships which go beyond sharing a research 
project or attending each other’s’ policy events. Public universities, as institutions, are often 
seen as too political for think tanks to be associated with them45 and high quality private 
university staff members are, at the moment, more attracted to consultancy work (often seen 
as more prestigious and more lucrative).  
 
The Policy Sphere  
The result of this political economy situation with the civil society and knowledge society 
impacts on the way, which think tanks and universities can take part in policymaking. In theory 
think tanks, like NGOs, have a political role to play in society (Harsh et al. 2010) although the 
way in which they interact with political actors and policy makers is rarely formalized sometimes 
undesired (Kabeer et al. 2010, Gauri & Galef 2005, Clarke 1998, Edwards & Hulme 1996). 
Overall, it is clear from the research findings that think tanks are significantly more active in 
the political sphere – in terms of policymaking - compared to universities.46 Universities, as 
institutions, whether they are public or private are not major actors in terms of policymaking. 
As explained in earlier sections, individually, university teachers are engaged in politics either 
through political parties directly or through civil society institutions such as NGOs and think 
tanks. The process of sequenced sub-contraction and commissioned research, as described 
in the earlier section, fragments the process of research and in turn, individuals’ and 
institutional’ capacities as well as the quality of research outcomes. In the face of these 
constraints emerging from the research demand and supply (as described in previous 
sections) side think tanks often adjust their research focus and sometimes their internal 
capacities.  
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Financial Dependency and Advocacy 
One could argue that the required changes in attitudes for a more democratic culture in the 
established policymaking process cannot occur through individual kinship-based relations but 
necessitates civil society institutions’ longer-term commitment and engagements with political 
processes. The data collected shows how the fragmentation of think tank’s mission across 
diverse stakeholders weakens their advocacy and leadership capacity, as often, the focus of 
their research has been set by external agents. There is therefore a problem of ownership over 
the issues that are being researched through commissioned work. The fact that most research 
conducted by think tanks is commissioned by external funders, to a certain extent erodes the 
capacity of these civil society actors to bring sustainable change in key areas of policymaking 
in the long-run. Dr. Debapriya said “I think that these two missions, the research and .. policy 
advocacy, require independence, which is not attained by think tanks.”  
 
Think tanks, which heavily rely on external funds, often have an issue of identity in that they 
have often lost control over their research focus and internal capacities, which have become 
fluid and malleable.  Without a clear policy focus and stable and reliable capacities to serve it, 
think tanks have limited credibility and opportunity to influence policymaking. It is, therefore, 
difficult to be “ahead” of the policymaking process. They inform policy makers on the impact of 
policies, instead of conducting research and advocacy activities around issues, which are new 
to policy makers. The fragmentation of the institutional capacities down to the individual level 
affects the efficacy of think tanks in the long-term. Consequently, the potential influence of 
think tanks on policy relies on their adaptability to both supply and demand pressures.  
Manzoor Hasan said:  
 
Think tanks do not address or meet the needs for policymaking because they are 
focused on meeting the needs of the donors. So their work does not focus on the 
government’s and public sector’s needs. But there is another important reason…… 
there is not the kind of demand that there should be from the public sector. The 
problems are therefore stemming from both the type of supply and the type of demand.  
 
This quote illustrates how the contribution of think tanks to policy is not only dependent on 
think tanks’ capacities to produce and disseminate knowledge but also reflect how “uneven” or 
“weak” the type of research demand from the government and policy makers, who are yet to 
be convinced about the utility and the value of qualitative research for example, especially if 
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they have not commissioned it.47 The efficiency in affecting policy depends on their openness 
and willingness to read policy notes, report, flagship publications when policy makers in 
Bangladesh are generally more sensitive to quantitative evidence.  
 
Political Influence and Autonomy 
Think tanks that intend to be active in the political society and influence policy (as opposed to 
inform it by anticipating, monitor or assessing impact of policies and activities) have little room 
for manoeuvre and face common challenges. Although, think tanks might be given a window 
by government offices and structures to inform policy (by analysing budget or policy impact or 
prediction of impact)  it is a different mission to driving policy and “being ahead of policymaking” 
which many respondents have identified as the main mission of think tanks48. Institution such 
as BIISS, BIDS and PRI might, therefore, be “active” in the political sphere as policy informants 
but have a limited role and produce little independent and impartial research work that would 
lead to new policies. In that sense, the impartiality and objectivity of the research outputs of 
think tanks and of their political and policy intention vary according to their leadership 
capacities and political aspirations. The former might also be influenced by their funding 
opportunities. Similarly to NGOs therefore the accountability of think tanks and their capacity 
to remain independent from politics is challenged. Devine (2006) explored this paradox 
between the need of NGOs, to remain non-political representative of civil society and active 
political players, and the data collected here indicates that think tanks are experiencing such 
a paradox whereby donors’ intervention both helps think tanks sustain their research activities 
and affect their advocacy autonomy. The way in which think tanks select research themes (or 
projects), the way in which they conduct it and invest in their in-house capacity heavily depend 
on their funding sources and terms.  
 
The data indicates that the strategy adopted by most think tanks (located outside universities 
and which do not have access to predictable untied funding) is to behave like “consultancy 
firms” which would suit both the supply for research funding and the demand for information49 
(Faro 2012:15), which has implications for governance in Bangladesh. We found little evidence 
that think tanks advocate for a political alternative (although this is one of their core functions) 
to key policy issues and that, in general their role and capacity to challenge policy is limited. 




47 Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya and Dr. Bazlul Khondaker  
48 Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya, Mr. Manzoor Hasan and Dr. Bazlul Khondaker  
49 Dr. Bazlul Khondoker ; Mr. Manzoor Hasan ; Dr. Binayak Sen 
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Because they must keep good relations with the policy makers and avoid political confrontation 
in order to be effective, some of them either chose to follow a strict demand-based approach 
to research (mostly based on consultancy work) and only few manage to maintain a focus on 
one particular issue, a niche (through collaboration with foreign universities or think tanks or 
access to predictable, long-term core funding). In general, it is found that think tanks active 
within the policy sphere in Bangladesh generally lack political aspirations because they do not 
have sufficient financial and human capacity, willingness or time to pursue. The relationships 
amongst think tanks and between them and university individual staff members rarely involve 
collaboration around policy dialogues, lobbying activities or joint policy publications it mainly 
corresponds to attending each conferences, seminars and dialogues. This makes the influence 
of think tanks on the policymaking process more informal, individualized, fragmented and 
iterative instead of building the institutional capacities of non-state actors to represent a political 




The diverse relationships between think tanks and universities in Bangladesh within three 
major domains (knowledge society, civil society and the policy sphere) have been analysed 
and discussed in this paper. This paper provides an in-depth picture of the demand and supply 
pressures think tanks and universities face in the political economy context of Bangladesh. 
The data indicates that in the knowledge society there are only a handful of actors that have 
the capacity to maintain their “academic freedom”, or autonomy to produce independent 
knowledge. The data shows that there are some significant financial, political and structural 
constraints which institutions face and which often affect the type and quality of research 
outputs emerging from the knowledge society. It is clear from the data collected that there are 
only a few think tanks, which, as institutions, qualify as active members of the knowledge 
society. Individual think tank staff members are also sometimes drawn in for particular inputs 
such as designing curriculums or courses and modules. These relationships vary across 
institutions and individuals. The tangible or immaterial outputs can have some formal or 
informal impact on policymaking or on the way in which policymaking is structured and 
understood (a on figure 2). 
 
Because knowledge society faces a critical lack of funds, the production of certain types of 
knowledge and research tends to be implemented by civil society actors. A large number of 
civil society actors conduct some form of “research” (monitoring, ex-post assessment, etc.), 
which contributes to informing and providing an evidence-base for policy makers. The lack of 
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independence and autonomy of civil society actors can affect the value and the quality of 
knowledge they produce, and their research capacity. The underlying trend of 
commercialization of knowledge creation and information dissemination influences the 
relationships between universities and think tanks and incentivizes them to collaborate on 
short-term, output-based research projects. These relationships mainly include report reviews, 
paper editing and methodological support to the research project. Such activities are generally 
described as consultancy work, which pulls academics out of university structures to 
collaborate with civil society actors (b on figure 2). Significant barriers faced in the two types 
of institutions push towards a less independent research agenda (decided by donors and 
funders’ terms) carried out in a fragmented manner by different types of institutions and 
individuals.  
 
Looking at the Bangladesh case study from the perspective of democratisation, this study 
presents some of the most important limits of civil society’s potential contribution to the 
consolidation of democratic structures in Bangladesh and the paradoxes this can encompass. 
This precarious manner of producing knowledge (demand-based), results in consultancy 
reports with often questionable analytical or academic value. These dynamics serve a 
knowledge creation system, which is ad-hoc (a response to policies) rather than one which 
precedes it. The fragmentation occurring within the knowledge building and dissemination 
continuum interferes with the development of strong institutional capacities or strong research 
autonomy at the think tank level. In Bangladesh, it can affect the capacity of think tanks to drive 
and own their research agenda and their capacities to critically engage with policy (c on figure 
2). Therefore, despite the active role played by think tanks within the policy sphere, the task of 
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 Respondents name Current position  Past positions50 
Institute of 
Governance Studies 
Manzoor Hasan, OBE Institutional Advisor IGS BRACU 
 
Deputy Executive Director of BRAC 
Founding Executive Director of TIB51 
Regional Director (Asia-Pacific) of TI 
Dr. Sultan Hafeez 
Rahman 
Executive Director IGS 
  
Director General of ADB’s52 Pacific Department,  
Deputy Director General of SARD  
Adviser to the Ministry of Finance and Planning 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies 
Centre for Policy 
Dialogue 
Prof Mustafizur Rahman Executive Director CPD 
 
Member of the Panel of Economists for the SFYP53 and the 
TYPP54  
Member of the Panel of Economists for the Seventh Five Year 
Plan 
WTO Advisory Committee 





Chair of Southern Voice on Post-MDG International 
Development Goals 
Special Adviser on LDCs to the Secretary General, UNCTAD 
President of UNCTAD’s governing board 




50 This list is non-exhaustive  
51 Transparency International Bangladesh 
52 Asian Development Bank 
53 Sixth Five Year Plan 






Dr. Binayak Sen Director of Research Policy-adviser and part of a number of national committees 
(Member of the Macroeconomic Consultative Committee to the 
Ministry of Finance)  
Member of the International Steering Committee of the South 
Asia Network of Economic Institutes (SANEI)  
Adjunct Professor at the Institute of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, formed under the National University Dhaka  
Dr. S.M. Zulfiqar Ali Senior Research Fellow Research and Communication Director EEP/shiree 
Bangladesh Institute 
of International and 
Strategic Studies 
Munshi Faiz Ahmad Chairman, Board of Governors Ambassador (Grade-A) of Bangladesh to the People's 
Republic of China 
High Commissioner of Bangladesh to Singapore. 
Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of 
Bangladesh to the United Nations, New York. 
Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka 





Dr. Ahsan H. Mansur Executive Director Fiscal Affairs and Policy Review and Development 
departments and area departments of the IMF 
IMF Senior Resident Representative to Pakistan during 1998-
01  
Fiscal Advisor to the Minister of Finance  
Division Chief of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  
IMF Mission Chief for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman 
Prof Bazlul Khondaker Senior Fellow Dhaka University as a Professor of Economics 




Dr. Hossain Zillur 
Rahman 
Executive Chairman 
Drafting of the poverty reduction strategy of the government 
in 2005  
Member of the Independent South Asian Commission on 
Poverty Alleviation (ISACPA).  
Founder of Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC) 
Researcher at BIDS 
Adviser (cabinet minister) to the Caretaker Government of 
Bangladesh- ministries of commerce and education.  
President of the Dhaka University Economics Department 
Alumi Association DUEDAA 
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 Mr. Khondoker Sakhawat 
Ali 
Research Fellow 
Research Fellow at Power and Participation Research Center  
Lead of the education research team.  
BRAC Development Institute, Communication Coordinator 
Managing Editor, Protichinta, Journal 
Unnoyon Onneshan Rashed Titumir Chairman Lecturer in economics at Dhaka university  
Advisor to the government on multilateral negotiations such as 
WTO, UNFCCC, UNCBD. 
Member of different UN committees of experts. 
Dhaka University  Prof. Mahbubul 
Mokaddem Akash Professor of Economics 
Lead economist 
Dr. Mahbuba Nasreen 
Director of Institute of Disaster 
Management and Vulnerability 
Studies 
Member, National Disaster Management Advisory Committee 
(NDMAC), Ministry of Food and Disaster Management,  
Executive Member, South Asian Sociological Society 
Joint Secretary, Bangladesh Sociological Association (BSA), 
2010 
Executive Member, Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon 
(Environment Movement/BAPA) and former Joint Secretary 
Jahangir Nogor 
University  
Dr. Manas Kumar 
Chowdhury Professor of Anthropology 
Head of the department of Anthropology  




Dr. Saleemul Huq 
 
Director of the International Centre for 
Climate Change & Development 
(ICCCAD) 
Chairman of BCAS (Bangladesh Center for Advanced Studies) 
Board of Directors  
Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize – as contributor to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 
Director of the Climate Change Programme at International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) 
Consultant at the World Bank, UNFCCC, Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) Washington DC, SIDA, Sweden and NORAD 
(developing climate change programme). 
North South 
University 
Dr. M. Emdadul Haq Chairman, Department of General & 
Continuing Education 
Institute of Governance Studies (IGS), BRAC University, 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2007 – 2010 
Founder Chair & Professor of the Department of International 
Relations, University of Chittagong 
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Professor at Department of Political Science, University of 
Chittagong 
Prof ATM Nurul Amin Professor and Dean Division Chairman of Human Settlements Development at AIT 
Senior UN Fellow with the United Nations Centre for Regional 
Development (UNCRD), Nagoya, Japan and  
Guest Editor of Regional Development Dialogue 
University of Asia 
Pacific (UAP) 
BUET 
Jamilur Reza Chowdhury Vice Chancellor Doctor of Engineering (Honoris Causa) degree by Manchester 
University on 20th October, 2010 
BRAC University Vice Chancellor 
Adviser (Minister) in the Non-Party Caretaker Government in 
April, 1996 and was in charge of the Ministry of Energy and 








Case Study 1: IGS 
 
A year after its inception, the Centre of Governance Studies reached the status of an Institute 
in 2006 under the direction of Dr. Akbar Ali Khan, a distinguished international and national 
civil servant as well as a Professor at BRACU Business School. After him IGS was directed by 
Barrister Manzoor Hasan, the founding director of Transparency International in Bangladesh 
(TIB) and a Deputy Executive Director of BRAC, and now by Dr. Sultan Hafeez Rahman, the 
current Executive Director. 
 
IGS has benefitted from dedicated and visionary leaders and executive directors, enabled to 
develop strong academic webs and linkages with donors and academic partners in the US, 
UK, Dutch and Australian universities. To pursue its institutional mission, IGS strategizes to 
place itself as a major civil society actor in Bangladesh and as an independent institute 
focusing on governance issues while also issuing Masters level teaching on this to civil 
servants and NGOs or think tanks staff members. The question of relationship of the Institute 
with universities in Bangladesh is, in this case, asking the question of its relationships with 
BRACU because of the structure of the think tank. This case study analyses the importance 
and significance of this think tank/university relationships for the teaching, training and 
advocacy activities undertaken by IGS.   
 
In a context where continuous efforts to regularly deliver quality outputs is rare, IGS reinforced 
its presence by publishing Briefing and Policy Notes, based on survey data addressed to policy 
makers and the GOB as well as regular contribution to national newspapers’ op-eds in order 
to sensitise the general public about governance issues. IGS uses qualitative research 
approaches alongside quantitative survey data, which is uncommon and challenging in a 
context where quantitative evidence generally is more valued by policy makers than qualitative 
data. IGS is also regarded as a strong research centre with international collaborations (with 
universities and think tanks abroad). Through its contribution within the World Bank’s Affiliated 
Network for Social Accountability (ANSA) programme and its support from IDRC, IGS 
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developed important capacities to produce and disseminate quality research activities55 and 
regular published outputs. IGS’s most nationally renowned research output are the State of 
Governance Reports (SOGs, henceforth) (four since 2006) and the State of Cities (SOC) 
Urban Governance in Dhaka Report (since 2012). Manzoor Hasan, who instituted the 
production of these Reports, thought of it as a contribution to exploring development issues 
“through a new dimension” and a “useful new angle”.56  In general, the authority of these reports 
is strengthened by IGS’s internal peer review processes. 
 
IGS has implemented professional training courses and Masters Degrees as well as advocacy 
activities. IGS’s mission is ‘to identify, promote and support effective, transparent, accountable, 
equitable and citizen-friendly government in Bangladesh and South Asia. ‘IGS’ motto is 
‘Bringing Value to Public Life’ as stated on the institute’s website and confirmed by Dr. Hafeez 
Rahman. To this effect, IGS established its early reputation through Masters programmes57 as 
well as certified professional training course. Inspired by BRAC’s lesson learning, IGS 
developed a Masters course on issues of governance to early career civil servants called the 
Masters in Governance and Development.   
 
There are clear substantial advantages of being located within BRAC for IGS regarding its 
teaching mission. Firstly, the aptitude of IGS to deliver certificates is an important comparative 
advantage compared to other think tanks, which are located outside universities. This directly 
derives from its positioning under the BRAC umbrella. The implications of being located within 
or alongside the BRAC structure was not negligible to establish the reputation of IGS’s training 
and Masters courses, the MAGD programme in particular. Secondly, historically, BRAC 
intervene to maintain the continuity of the MAGD. Although the Masters course was initially 
supported by a grant from the Dutch Government for the first three years, after the grant ended 
the programme experienced a brief interruption before BRAC directly sustained the 
programme through direct financial provision. The quality of these programmes is generally 
acknowledged in the country and within the government. Thirdly, to a lesser extent IGS largely 
relies on external lecturers and speakers located within public and private universities 
(including BRACU) to deliver high quality courses. These examples show how the formal 




55 Such as the Journalism Training and Research Initiative (JATRI) 
56 Interview with Mr. Manzoor Hasan 
57 Masters in governance and development (established in 2005) and Masters in procurement and 
supply management (to start in Spring 2014) 
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institutional relationship between IGS and BRACU can broaden the type of activities 
undertaken by IGS and facilitate their implementation. 
 
The data collected, however, indicates that IGS faces significant difficulties in trying to 
influence policy. The institutional advisor of IGS explained that although the quality of the SOG 
and SOC was broadly acknowledged by development partners; it is unclear as to whether 
policy makers read these reports. In response to this, IGS started publishing more “digestible” 
shorter versions of them under Policy Briefs and Policy Notes format in order to penetrate 
policy circles and sensitise them to key issues of governance. This is even more challenging 
as the analysis presented in these reports can often challenge the current governance 
structures or systems of the country, a topic which the targeted audience might be reluctant to 
read about. To this attempt IGS convenes international and national conferences on 
governance themes58 alongside organizing workshops, seminars and publications public 
launches convening the media. This could question the capacity of IGS to fulfil its advocacy 
mission nationally and what role BRAC plays in strengthening IGS’s national presence. Based 
on the data collected the analysis of IGS strength and opportunities suggest that the on-going 
relationship between BRAC and IGS is not yet used at its full potential and that both institutions 
could significantly benefit from stronger collaboration. 
 
The case study of IGS briefly presented here summarizes key dimensions of the IGS domain 
of expertise and activities and highlights the type of relationship it has with BRACU as well as 
their implications in way of IGS mission. It appears that IGS location under the BRAC University 
umbrella leads to developing more formal institutional relationships, which are largely 
collaborative. It also seems that it adds more formality and bureaucracy to the Institute’s 
management, regulations and practices. This set up, for the moment, provides important 
benefits (international recognition, certification ability and staff migration) whilst also holding 
some drawbacks on the institute’s agency especially regarding outreach and advocacy 
activities. There might be a sense that IGS is competing with some research departments at 
BRACU (like the BRAC Development Institute, BDI) at the national level, however, IGS 
remains a leading well-established research institute which has enough credibility and 
authoritativeness to focus on governance issues. Besides, IGS staff members also have 




58 The International Conference on ‘40 years of Governance in Bangladesh: Retrospect and Future Prospects’ in 
November 2011, and two national conferences in December 2012 and January 2013 for example. 
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individual relationships with other universities (both private and public) where they occasionally 
deliver seminars, workshops or lectures. 
 
Case Study 2: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) was first created in 1957 in the name of 
the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) which was a public enterprise 
established with both public (government of Pakistan) and private (Ford Foundation) funds to 
conduct policy-oriented research work in Pakistan. In the late 1960s, PIDE was considered by 
many as one of the leading development research centres. Later, it was moved from Karachi 
to Dhaka in 1970 because it contained many bright Bengali economists and researchers and 
after the war of independence in 1971 it was renamed as the Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies. Compared to the large majority of think tanks in Bangladesh, BIDS 
receives regular core funding from the government. Although the charter upon which BIDS 
was created stipulates that the Institute is an independent policy research entity, the 
relationship between BIDS and the government has, over the years, evolved. Although BIDS 
played a key role, with the Planning Commission, in re-shaping the country’s economy in the 
post-war period, its linkages with the state has slightly waned as it insisted on preserving its 
independence from the military regimes as well as the political parties wanting to influence its 
work. The government’s attempt to nominate the director of BIDS in 1991 to politicize the 
Institute led to a leadership crisis in the think tank.59 The case study of BIDS is important to 
our study, as it illustrates the situations of think tanks/ universities relationship from the angle 
of an institute whose activities rely essentially on public finances. More than the issue of 
financial sustainability, it is the issue of autonomy which transcends this institutional case 
study. 
BIDS is ranked 15th in the Top 40 Think Tanks in Asia (Excluding China, India, Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea) (McGann, 2012) and ranked 99th in the world. Nowadays, the presence of 
the government is reflected through the composition of the Board of Trustee at BIDS. It consists 
of 13 members, including a member of the Planning Commission, the Governor of Bangladesh 
Bank and the secretaries attached to the Ministries of Finance and Education. The research 




59 At the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), the chairman is 
systematically appointed for two years by the ministry of defense. The recently appointed chairman at 
BIISS is an ex-ambassador to China. 
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at BIDS is organized into five divisions which are: the Agriculture and Rural Development 
Division covering agriculture, natural resources management, and rural development related 
issues; the General Economics Division focusing on macroeconomic policies and global 
issues; the Human Resources Development Division covers the human related issues such as 
poverty, education, health and gender; the fourth one is the Industry and Physical Infrastructure 
Division which focuses on studying national manufacturing activities, industries, and 
infrastructures; lastly, the Population Studies Division researches on population dynamics and 
covers sociological behavioural studies (empowerment and reproductive behaviour, health, 
consumption, health-seeking behaviour, vulnerability, poverty, domestic violence, citizenship 
and dowry for instance).  
On research scope and publication quality, BIDS’ Major Findings and Policy Implications of 
Completed Studies reports on the major sponsored research projects undertaken by the 
Institute between July 2011 and December 2012 and on their policy implications. Within one 
year BIDS’ work covered a total of 13 research studies, of which one study was funded by the 
BIDS Research Endowment Fund (REF), while the remaining 12 studies were sponsored by 
government departments/agencies (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, BBS, the Rural 
Development and Cooperatives Division, Ministry of LGRD and Cooperatives, The Ministry of 
Food, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Women and Children 
Affairs,) and national and international institutions (Asian Development Bank, SANEI, South 
Asian Network of Economic Research Institute, The World Bank and UNDP for example). The 
duration of the sponsored projects undertaken ranges from one month to two years (BIDS 
2013).  
The most recent research work undertaken by BIDS60 covered several areas, including barriers 
to the development of livestock and fisheries sectors, impact evaluation of maternity allowance 
programme, providing support to Parliamentary Standing Committees on oversight of budget 
implementation, energy subsidies and profile of groups vulnerable to energy sector reforms in 
Bangladesh, structure and growth of rural non-farm sector in Bangladesh, review and long-run 
impact study of projects and programmes. In conducting this sponsored research work and 
writing the publication outcome (reports or sometimes article) BIDS rarely engages with 
universities at an institutional level or at an individual level. It conducts its research and analysis 
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predominantly by using internal resources. At the moment BIDS has very limited interactions 
with universities and university staff members whether this concerns research, publication or 
training activities.  
A research contract has recently been signed between BIDS and the Implementation 
Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the Ministry of Planning to undertake impact evaluation 
of five government implemented development projects. These are: (1) Small Scale Water 
Resources Projects–II; (2) National Agricultural Technology Project Phase–I; (3) Technical 
Training Centers/ IGA Institutes in the Districts of Bangladesh under Different ADP Funded 
Projects of Various Ministries; (4) Reaching Out of School Children Projects (4th revision) of 
the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education; and (5) Hygiene, Sanitation and Water 
Supply.BIDS created its own academic journal called the Bangladesh Development Studies 
(BDS), which is the refereed quarterly flagship journal of the Institute. It publishes research 
articles, notes and book reviews by BIDS researchers as well as national and international 
scholars. It benefits from a strong international reputation and is currently in its 37th years of 
publication. BIDS incentivises it staff to publish in international peer-reviewed journals through 
its promotion systems. BIDS has very strict promotion rules based on staff members’ academic 
publications quality and number61 as well as its own internationally recognized peer-reviewed 
journal. This stands as a rare exception, and in general, think tanks have low or poor 
publications quality standards and monitoring. Such systems certainly incentivize staff 
members to focus on conducting original research work and publish regularly in international 
academic journals, which meet, at least, BDS quality standards. 
Following the path taken by its sister organisation in Pakistan which has become PIDE 
University, BIDS has for a few years started thinking about initiating its own academic 
programme. The research participants explained that the institutional capacities of BIDS are 
comprehensive and based on its strong faculty and research capabilities. Proposals have been 
sent to the university grants commission to implement two Masters Degree programmes in 
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Case Study 3: Dhaka University 
 
Established in 1921 under the Dacca University Act 1920 of the Indian Legislative Council, 
Dhaka University (DU) is modelled after British universities. DU is the largest public university 
in Bangladesh, with 33,000 students and 1,800 staff members. In Bangladesh, in the 1990s, 
few public institutions benefitted from international recognition, including BUET and Dhaka 
University which was once called “the Oxford of the East”.62. However, the university has since 
suffered from intense politicization. The introduction of social sciences (sociology, 
anthropology and development studies) at DU was initiated by donors in 1990s63.  
 
The Case Study of DU helps illustrate the trend universities (public and private) experience in 
developing their own in-house think tanks. DU has 70 departments under 13 faculties and 
hosts 42 research centres. The number of research centres increased significantly particularly 
since the late 1980s. Some of them were set up to commemorate the memory of a late 
professor, others to encourage inter-disciplinary and intra-DU departments’ linkages. If some 
of the research centres are apparently active and conduct regular research and publication 
work, others on the contrary seem to be inactive (or at least seemingly inactive). The later may 
have run out of financial support (but keep the structure of the centre in place) and become 
“façade centres” with no actual programme or staff members. There are non-negligible benefits 
to keeping these centres alive. For DU, teachers having their own, or being part of a research 
centre increases their status and promotes the prestige of their work through networking. 
According to the research participants, the motivations for developing these institutes are 
manifold:  
1- It enables DU to widen its thematic coverage and multiply its domains of expertise 
and draws international observers’ attention towards specific issues. 
2- It creates a suitable administrative platform to help mutual collaboration and 
consultation amongst researchers and teachers to develop research proposals for 
grants application and bids. 
3- It contributes to enhancing individuals’ capacities to disseminate research outcomes 
through conferences, seminar, workshops, as well as through publications of journal 
articles. 
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4- It encourages collaborative research among development practitioners, NGOs, 
development partners for influencing government policies and practices.  
 
The Director of the Institute of Disaster Management and Vulnerability Studies (IDMVS), one 
of the 42 research centres located at DU, clearly explained that the funds dedicated to 
financing academic research were not sufficient at public universities. She also said that private 
universities can better afford to do so because of the significantly higher tuition fees they 
charge to their students. The Institute awards its own undergraduate and Master’s degrees. 
The relationships between this institute and other national and inter-national stakeholders 
seem to have been significantly simplified by its status and structure within DU. The Institute 
collaborates regularly with various government ministries and agencies, development partners, 
and national and international NGOs. Students of the institute’s graduate and post-graduate 
courses benefit from the technical and financial supports from the government of Bangladesh’s 
Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP-II). Certainly, the type of 
relationship often depends on the nature of the activities to be undertaken, but the respondent 
affirmed that most of the relationships between IDMVS and international or national 
organisations are usually formalized under the form of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). 
The Institute’s internship and fellowship as well as the research and publication activities are 
set up with the financial and technical support of Associated British Food, International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, Bangladesh Red Crescent Society and 
Voluntary Services Overseas under a series of Memorandums of Understanding (MoU).  
 
As explained in the main text of this paper, DU teachers and faculty members are also involved 
in conducting research, publishing and advocacy activities with Think Tanks located outside 
DU. This is, according to all our research participants, very common in public universities. This 
way, teachers extend their personal networks, conduct good quality research work, increase 
their income substantially and often obtain published work too. DU officially “allows” this 
consultancy type work, according to our respondents, as this is also a way of keeping teachers 
and faculty members up-to-date with practice by giving them the opportunity broaden their 
personal working experience in their field of expertise. The activities undertaken can range 
from reviewing bid or grant application document to taking the lead in publishing report and 
papers or supervising research work (using a specific set of theoretical knowledge, analytical 
skills and/or methodological competence). Such relationships are, as explained earlier, heavily 
based upon personal networks and individual connectedness in the sector rather than 
institutionalized and formalized relationships. 
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